Maldives' Fight for Chagos: Decolonization and Historical Rights

Maldivians for Chagos
Maldives Chagos Decolonisation Initiative
An Investigative Feature
The Maldives Chagos Decolonisation Initiative is a civic research effort that documents Maldivian historical, legal and decolonisation rights relating to the Chagos Archipelago. It draws on archival evidence, international law and United Nations procedure to challenge inherited colonial frameworks and restore erased Maldivian history to the public record.

Prologue: The Story India Tells Itself

India likes to imagine itself as the moral heir of Bandung, the 1955 Asian-African Conference, where newly independent states gathered to reject colonial domination and to declare a shared commitment to post-imperial solidarity. At Bandung, India positioned itself as the natural guide of that emerging world order, presenting itself as the principled voice of decolonisation. It continues to invoke this inheritance whenever its diplomats take the floor at the United Nations.

But myth is not history, and performance is not principle. A state’s true record is found in the archives it did not write, in the omissions it cannot defend, in the satellite images it cannot hide, and in the silences it imposes on its neighbours. The Chagos question exposes the dissonance between India’s self-image and its actual conduct. Once the costume falls away, what remains is strategic calculation.

I. The Year India Looked Away

In 1961, the United Nations established the Special Committee on Decolonisation with a mandate recorded clearly in the founding resolution:

“A Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is hereby established.” (UNGA Resolution 1654)

India later chaired this committee. Yet at that moment, the Maldives was still a British protectorate, a status that falls directly within the definition provided by Resolution 1541:

“A Non-Self-Governing Territory is one which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and or culturally from the country administering it.” (UNGA Resolution 1541)

The Maldives satisfied this definition completely. Still, it was never placed on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. India did not question the omission. A missing protectorate is not a clerical oversight when the leading regional power is presiding over the UN body responsible for decolonisation oversight. India saw the disappearance and chose silence. That silence shaped the Maldives’ subsequent diplomatic and legal position for decades.

II. The Evidence India Pretends Not to See

The Maldivian presence in Chagos is not conjecture. It appears in British archival documents. The Admiralty seizure report from Diego Garcia records:

“One hundred and twenty-six persons, including women and children, were taken on board.”
(Admiralty Records, ADM 1 2198)

Ceylon’s Colonial Office files list Maldivians in the slave registers between 1810 and 1813 (Ceylon Colonial Office, CO 54 series).

H. C. P. Bell’s historical survey notes that:

“The islanders of the south were accustomed to seasonal voyages far beyond the ordinary limits of Maldivian travel.” (Bell, 1922)

Modern ethnography underscores the reality of forced displacement. Jeffery writes:

“The displacement of islanders was the result of deliberate administrative policy rather than natural abandonment or voluntary migration.” (Jeffery, 2011)

India is fully aware of these records. They are standard sources in Indian Ocean historiography. India disregards them not because they are unclear, but because they complicate the tidy Mauritius-centred narrative that India prefers. A Maldives with documented history in Chagos would no longer be a silent observer. It would be a claimant.

III. Agaléga: Where India’s Principles Meet Concrete

India describes its work on Agaléga as development cooperation. Satellite analysis contradicts this. The CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative notes:

“The runway now measures approximately 3,000 meters, long enough to support most Indian naval aircraft.”
(CSIS AMTI, 2022)

The Lowy Institute reports:

“New, larger facilities are visible, which suggest dual-use capability.” (Lowy Institute, 2021)

Defence scholarship identifies the purpose directly. Abhilash concludes:

“India’s presence in Agaléga significantly enhances its maritime domain awareness in the Southwest Indian Ocean.” (Abhilash, 2023)

These findings rely on observable infrastructure. A runway of that scale is not humanitarian work. Agaléga exists to extend India’s maritime reach and secure a forward presence pointed across the Mascarene Basin toward Diego Garcia. The physical evidence leaves no space for moral declarations.

IV. The Diego Garcia Paradox

India speaks with conviction about colonial injustice, yet it avoids addressing the most prominent colonial-era military base in the region. The International Court of Justice held:

“The United Kingdom is under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible.” (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2019)

The Court also noted:

“The United States continues to maintain a military presence on Diego Garcia.” (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 2019)

India did not challenge this ongoing military presence. Instead, it supported the United Nations resolution endorsing the ICJ’s findings:

“The General Assembly demands that the United Kingdom withdraw its colonial administration.” (UNGA Resolution 73/295)

The resolution says nothing about the United States. India’s support for it applies pressure to London while preserving its alignment with Washington and reinforcing its partnership with Mauritius. The inconsistency reveals the calculation.

V. The Maldives and the Regional Mechanics of Pressure

Influence in South Asia seldom takes the form of overt statements. It works through relationships, economic leverage, strategic access and political expectations. Ganguly writes that:

“India has sought to shape the political environment of its neighbours through a mixture of pressure and partnership.” (Ganguly, 2018)

Baru observes that:

“India’s policy relies on the cultivation of political classes who understand the costs of defying Indian preferences.” (Baru, 2019)

Rehman adds that:

“India’s naval ascendancy rests, in part, on the compliance of smaller Indian Ocean states.” (Rehman, 2017)

This environment ensures that Maldivian political actors understand the risks of asserting claims that conflict with India’s preferred regional architecture. No threat is required. The expectation of alignment is enough.

VI. India’s Post-Colonial Empire in the Mirror

India’s behaviour does not match the image it promotes. It resembles a post-colonial state adopting methods once used by the imperial powers it condemns. Brewster notes:

“India sometimes mirrors the behaviour of the very powers it once opposed.” (Brewster, 2020)

India ignored the Maldives’ exclusion from the UN decolonisation system, erased Maldivian continuity in Chagos, constructed military installations on foreign territory, shielded American power and shaped regional decision-making. Its rhetoric is liberation, its method is hierarchy.

VII. The Maldives Has the Right to Speak

The Maldives did not choose to be excluded from the United Nations decolonisation process. It was excluded because it was never listed. The Maldives did not invent its historical relationship to Chagos. British archives confirm it. The Maldives did not build new airfields in Agaléga. India did.

No state has the authority to silence the Maldives on its own history. The Indian Ocean requires honesty, the Chagos story requires truth, and the Maldives requires recognition rather than erasure.

India’s costume may be elegant, but its strategic ambition is visible in the light.

References

Abhilash, S. (2023). India’s strategic presence in the Southwest Indian Ocean. Journal of Defence Studies, 17(1).
Admiralty Records. (1810). HMS Sir Francis Drake seizure report (ADM 1 2198). The National Archives, Kew.
Baru, S. (2019). The strategic consequences of India’s economic rise. Routledge.
Bell, H. C. P. (1922). The Maldive Islands. Ceylon Government Press.
Brewster, D. (2020). India’s island strategy and the Indian Ocean power balance. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 16(2), 238 256.
Ceylon Colonial Office. (1810 1813). Dispatches on Maldivian prisoners and slave registers (CO 54 47 53). The National Archives, Kew.
CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2022). India’s strategic footprint in Agaléga.
Ganguly, S. (2018). India’s role in South Asian political dynamics. International Security, 43(3), 45 78.
International Court of Justice. (2019). Legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965.
Jeffery, L. (2011). Chagos islanders in Mauritius and the UK. Berghahn.
Lowy Institute. (2021). India’s Agaléga Mystery.
Rehman, I. (2017). India’s military influence in the Indian Ocean region. Naval War College Review, 70(2).
UN General Assembly. (1960). Resolution 1541 (XV).
UN General Assembly. (1961). Resolution 1654 (XVI).
UN General Assembly. (2019). Resolution 73 295.